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A N D S O L D B Y B . L A W , J . S E W E L L , J . W A L T E R , A N D R . F A U L D E R .

M D C C L X X X I I .

[P r i c e T w o S H I L L I N G S .]

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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P R O O F S, &c.

THE following observations upon the present situation of this country would never have been written, much less published, did not a sort of despair prevail with many, the terrible consequence of which must be, that Great Britain will be under the necessity of submitting to whatever terms of peace may be dictated by its numerous enemies.

Numerous indeed they are, consisting of the revolted Colonies in America, France, Spain, Holland, Heyder Alley, and the Marattas. To these also may be in some measure added all the Baltic Powers, Flanders, and even Portugal *, in short, every state in Europe which hath signed the armed neutrality †.

Not-

* The Emperor of Morocco hath likewise so far taken part against us, that he will not permit his subjects to send provisions to Gibraltar.

† The plan of armed neutrality, first proposed by the Empress of Russia, is most clearly intended to depress England. By the law of nations, and of common sense, no country ever permitted their opponents to be supplied with what might enable them to prosecute the war, and consequently, whenever the weapons or means of attack are changed, the law of nations having established this principle, adapts itself to the new circumstances, however different may be the mode of warfare.

Before the introduction of gunpowder very cumbrous machines were used in sieges, and which required large quantities of timber. Now I will suppose a war to have taken place between the Austrians and

B

Prussians

Notwithstanding however that the greater part of Europe which hath sea-ports is thus combined against us, yet I shall be able to prove that we have upon the whole obtained very decisive advantages against each of our declared enemies, and consequently have a right to insist upon a just and honourable peace.

My authority for what I have here advanced is our own Gazette, which hath been examined during the whole war, and which, besides being a paper published by government, receives in this country the further check against the least misrepresentation, that there are I fear in all our fleets and armies, officers who would be glad to contradict the publick account given by their Admiral or General; whilst every news-paper is ready to publish the counter assertions of an anonymous correspondent.

Prussians five hundred years ago, and that the Austrians had procured timber for an *intended* siege from Saxony, a neutral power, which was to be carried either in Saxon waggons, or boats upon the Elbe: would not the Prussians have a right to seize such timber, though transported in neutral bottoms?

It may be said indeed, that timber is a commodity *promiscui usus*, and may be destined for building a house as well as a ship, or warlike machine; but of this the admiralty courts of the captors must necessarily judge, as otherwise they never will be able to reduce their enemies to reason.

Such courts of admiralty have immemorially existed in every civilized part of Europe, which hath any territory upon the sea-coast, and must therefore (at least in the dernier resort) be supposed to have determined justly. The point must likewise be necessarily decided in the courts of the captors, because the prize, with its witnesses and documents, is brought into the ports of the conqueror.

Sea wars of great consequence are not to be traced far back in the annals of Europe; nor was so extensive a one as the present ever experienced: but can there be a doubt that England hath not the same right to seize naval stores destined for the enemy (though shipped in neutral vessels) as would justify the Prussians in the case I have put, for stopping the Saxon waggons or boats?

I shall

I shall make up the account of Debtor and Creditor from these materials with each of our enemies, beginning with the revolted Colonies *, with whom we were first at war, and shall only premise some explanatory remarks upon two or three of the particulars.

In the list of troops lost on the one side or the other, I have made no deduction for what the victorious army may have suffered, except in the case of Bunker's-hill, which, though a victory on our part, must be acknowledged to have been a *Malplaquet*.

As for what happened at Lexington, I have passed it entirely over, because the loss on both sides seems to have been nearly equal, and probably inconsiderable.

The number of vessels taken from the Americans is according to the list transmitted by our admirals, with regard to which

* This rebellion hath been chiefly occasioned by the Americans refusing to pay taxes imposed by the legislature of the mother-country, because they are not represented in the English parliament.

I do not mean to enter into the discussion of this subject, which can now be only decided by the sword, any further than by suggesting, that *protection* to subjects, seems to imply the right of *taxation*, as much perhaps as virtual, or even real *representation*. England hath expended much of her treasure, both in defence of the colonies when attacked, and by giving large bounties for the encouragement of their products.

Is it not reasonable therefore that the English parliament, which hath granted these sums, should afterwards resume in part what they have thus voted for the benefit of the colonies? If this be so, the imposition must be laid by England, for the Americans will never assess themselves, but for their own purposes. To remind the colonies of their obligations to the mother-country for their late flourishing condition, is addressing the wind, for they only deny the retribution which they owe to England, because they think you have enabled them to do so.

there cannot seemingly be any mistake*, till we were engaged in war with the French, Spaniards, and Dutch.

After this, the accounts become blended, particularly from the Jamaica station; in a list therefore of sixty captures (for example) I have allotted 30 of these vessels only to the rebels after the French war commenced: 20 when Spain declared against us; and 15 when the Dutch were added to our enemies†.

It is possible, therefore, that such a distribution may not in all instances be quite accurate, though the total loss must be so.

The balance in our favour, with regard to such captures, will probably surprize most readers; and in relation to the seamen it may be right to premise, that in the vessels taken from the rebels, I suppose there may be ten on board at an average, whilst I have allowed twenty for those which have been lost on our side‡.

As for the comparative ability of England and her numerous enemies to continue the war, that shall be reserved for discussion, when it shall appear from the following tables what

* It must be admitted, that, in some of our Gazettes, the numbers of vessels or troops are not quite so clearly stated as perhaps they might have been.

† The Jamaica station is so situated as to command vessels from North America, Hispaniola, Cuba, and Curasoa, as also the communication between each of these places.

‡ I suppose these to have amounted to 200, which certainly exceeds the number lost, as few have been captured except in their way to Boston, whilst it continued in our hands, as also some others in their voyage to Quebec. No mention is made on either side of prizes in the European seas; but it may be affirmed with confidence, that the balance on this head would be in our favour. I have also taken no allowance for the seamen on board 39 frigates and privateers.

country hath suffered most in the present contest, for such in the long run must supplicate for peace.

I shall now consider the article of territory which may have been acquired on either side, when, according to my conception at least, we shall still find the balance in our favour.

The revolted colonies having determined to rebel, they were of course in possession of their own provinces. Whatever therefore is now protected by our armies, as Penobscot, New York, Charles Town, and Georgia, is so much territory acquired to England. Nor in this account should our temporary possessions be forgotten, as of Boston, Rhode Island, &c. for whilst our troops occupied those posts, they were totally lost to the enemy. Need it be asked, that if a nation at war with England should be in possession of London for one year only, whether the distress would not be infinite, though the capital might afterwards be abandoned by the enemy?

I shall not decline, however, entering into the examination how much the mother country may be affected by our American Empire being diminished, supposing that certain provinces will never be recovered. If a map of the world is indeed consulted, the loss will appear to be very considerable, but if the advantage of the products, of very little importance.

To begin with New England, including Connecticut and Rhode island.

None of these afford any thing which is not much better raised in Great-Britain; and if they thirst for independence, we shall get rid of the expence of civil establishment, the much heavier charge of protecting them in time of war, and the payment of bounties.

New.

New Hampshire, indeed, and the province of Maine, were useful to the mother country by supplying masts and timber for ship-building; but both these articles may be procured from our new establishment at Penobscot, and the Bay of Fundye.

For these reasons it should seem that the loss of these provinces will not be severely felt by Great Britain.

The next colony is that of New York, all the valuable part of which is now in our possession, as we have every acre on the sea-coast.

Jersey follows, which the rebel armies march through and raise contributions upon, but they have no port, and consequently the acquisition is not much to be envied.

Pensylvania indeed hath a communication with the sea by the Delaware and Chesapeak; but both these are so much interrupted by our cruisers, that the province cannot much avail itself of this advantage. To this it may be added, that the products of Pensylvania and Jersey are similar to those of Great Britain, but inferior in quality.

In Maryland and Virginia, indeed, tobacco is cultivated, which we do not plant in England; but the reason of our not doing so arises from its being prohibited by acts of parliament, which are most shamefully permitted to continue unrepealed.

Virginia was first settled by the English in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and it need scarcely be observed, that soon afterwards smoking tobacco became so general, that James the First endeavoured to discourage the use of it with his Royal pen.

The consumption being great, and possibly the Virginians raising their price, it was attempted in the reign of Charles the First to cultivate tobacco in England, which answered greatly
to

to the planters, as appears most irrefragably by an ordinance of 1652, c. 2. *

It is therein recited that *great quantities* of tobacco are planted in *diverse parts* of this nation to the *prejudice and hindrance of the English plantations abroad*. The penalty therefore for continuing the cultivation is twenty shillings per rod, whilst it is made lawfull for any one to enter the ground and root it up.

Notwithstanding these prohibitions however, this sort of husbandry answered so greatly to the farmer, that eight years afterwards the parliament† doubled the penalty to forty shillings per rod, and directed the sheriff to destroy the plant wherever found, whilst at the same time the regulations are extended to Ireland‡, Berwick§, Jersey and Guernsey, so anxious was the legislature, in favour of the colonies, to prevent this profitable cultivation to the English farmer.

But even these additional regulations could not suppress what turned out to be so highly advantageous, and therefore within three years||, another act passed increasing the penalty to 10*l.* per rod. Nor was this even sufficient, for by the 22d and 23d of C. II. c. 26. new powers are given for the extirpation of this new husbandry, which were at last effectually carried into execution, but not without riots, especially in Lincolnshire.

The cultivation of tobacco having thus been prevented for a century, many have supposed that neither our soil or climate are

* See Scobell's Collection of ordinances.

† 12 Car. II. c. 34.

‡ This restriction with regard to Ireland is said to be wisely repealed by an act of the present session.

§ As Scotland could not be excluded before the Union, I am informed that they have planted tobacco north of the Tweed during the present season.

|| 15 C. VII. S. 18.

proper for this plant; but the contrary is most clearly proved by the successive acts of parliament which I have before cited *. There cannot therefore be the least shadow of either reason or justice in continuing these restrictions upon the English farmer, as they were originally imposed in favour of Virginia, which colony, after all our fostering indulgence, is now in actual rebellion. What I have before stated however shews, that we have no occasion for American tobacco, and that consequently the loss of that province will not materially affect the mother country.

If we are permitted indeed to enter into this cultivation, we shall soon undersell the Virginians in every market †, for labour is cheaper, the freight will be less, and, by means of the greater plenty of manure, we shall not be obliged to plant the tobacco in ground that is freshly broken up, as they are from year to year in Virginia ‡.

As for the next province of North Carolina, its produce is so inconsiderable, that it certainly does not pay the expence of its civil government. Wilmington, the chief town, does not consist of so many as 200 straggling houses; and we can interrupt their almost only navigation of Cape Fear river whenever we please from Charles Town.

* Many plants indeed are proper for most soils and climates; wheat, for example, is very good in Sicily, but so is that which is reaped in England.

† The government need not lose also the duties paid upon American tobacco, as when growing in England it may be excised as hops are.

‡ The consumption of tobacco is also greatly decreased by the disuse of smoking, whilst the taking of snuff likewise is less and less general; so that probably, in the beginning of the next century, the demand will be very inconsiderable.

In

In the two last provinces of South Carolina and Georgia it must be admitted that they raise indigo and rice, neither of which can be cultivated in England. We are now in possession indeed of Charles Town, the only port of the former, and the whole province of the latter; but supposing both these to be lost to the mother country, we have only to regret the indigo, for as to rice it is chiefly consumed by the inhabitants, and will only succeed in a marshy country, which need not be stated to be unhealthy in so considerable a southern latitude. If we are rid then of the expence of the civil establishment, we are sufficiently compensated for the little indigo which grows in these provinces; it can never answer to England to send forth its healthy inhabitants to such pestilential situations, as the Dutch have long experienced in their settlement at Batavia.

Having thus endeavoured to shew that England will not be materially affected by the loss of all the rebellious provinces, it may be asked perhaps, why then we have been at so great expence both of blood and treasure to recover them?

This perhaps is not necessary to be answered by me; but I conceive that England was obliged by true motives of policy to endeavour to crush the rebellion, and afterwards by those of justice to continue the war.

It is undoubtedly true that hostilities seldom answer to either of the contending nations, any more than law-suits to individuals; but though we know this generally to be the case, yet we must often risque the one and the other in order to prevent a greater mischief.

If the subjects of England, either in America or at home, resist the laws by which they have hitherto been bound, we must arm in the first instance, or otherwise our excellent constitution

will be shortly destroyed, in the room of which a republick will be substituted, or perhaps anarchy.

We may fail indeed in these constitutional efforts, but it behoves good citizens to have made them, be the event what it may.

When the mother country had thus determined (and with the approbation of parliament) to support its authority in America, several loyalists espoused our party, whose persons and effects were immediately seized upon by the ringleaders of rebellion. We were, therefore, now bound by every tie of justice to reinstate them if possible both in their liberties and property, nor should this great object be abandoned, but under the most cogent necessity.

It hath been the sense of a small majority in the present session of parliament, that we are now under that necessity, and that all further attempts to relieve any part of the continent from the usurped government of the rebels must be desisted from as ineffectual.

Whatever, therefore, may be our feelings for the sufferings of the American loyalists, we can do no more for them than pity their most melancholy and distressful situation.

Having shewn from the table that the revolted colonies have suffered greatly more than the mother country by the events of the present war*, let us now consider which hath the better means of continuing hostilities.

It is true that we have contracted a large additional debt† by prosecuting

* To these losses might be added the capture of several large privateers from not having been stated in the Gazette, as also the destruction of their fortifications, store-houses, barracks, sawing-mills, salt-pans, tobacco, &c.

† The whole of these millions hath entirely circulated within ourselves,

prosecuting the war against our American and other enemies ; but have not the rebels incurred a much greater in proportion to their abilities of payment, no computations having made it less than twenty millions sterling, which may be pronounced to be much more than the value of all the revolted provinces ! The sum of this debt, however, is not only immense, but the money hath been procured with the greatest difficulty and extortions ; whereas the contention in England hath always been from year to year who should be the lenders.

Our trade again hath been carried on with scarcely any molestation ; whereas that of the rebel colonies is almost annihilated, being reduced to a few ships which now and then escape from Boston and the Delaware.

But let us carry the comparison yet further. England hath enjoyed, during this time, all the blessings of prosperity and abundance ; whereas the rebels are destitute of many of the conveniencies, nay necessities of life, particularly salt, and most articles of cloathing.

The soil of North America is for the greater part very indifferent, scarcely supplying food to the inhabitants, even in times of profound peace ; but who will incur the expence of cultivation during the ravages of war*, when it is highly probable that he who sows may not reap the crop ?

Their distresses, therefore, may be pronounced to be such that they must anxiously long for peace ; but such is the tyranny of the Congress, that they are not permitted to publish either their wishes or calamities.

selves, without being squandered in armies upon the continent of Europe, or subsidies to allies.

* Every rebel colony hath suffered, and most materially, except Maryland.

It may, however, be said, that as yet they make no overtures for peace; which is true; their distresses, however, must occasion such an application, and speedily, unless the mother country shews too ardent a desire to negotiate.

This may be pronounced with as great certainty as that a man of fourscore years of age, under many severe complaints, cannot live long, and it is no answer to say, that as yet he is not dead.

But I will now admit (for the sake of argument) the rebels to have such resources, that they will wish to continue the war; yet I still conceive that England may easily bring them to reason.

It being the sense of the House of Commons that our armies are not to wage a continental war, it would be highly absurd not to remove our troops entirely, for though there seems to be little doubt that they would be able to maintain themselves both at New-York and Charles-Town, yet the very subsisting these troops with provisions from Ireland is an enormous expence, not to reckon their pay, and perhaps the still heavier article of contingencies.

It should seem, therefore, that both these garrisons should be removed, when the hurricane season is over, to the Leeward Islands, where we need have little doubt but those belonging to France must soon submit.

There is no occasion to ask the permission of the rebels to do this, and they will then be left to settle their affairs amongst themselves, when they will be soon sensible that the yoke of the mother country was comparatively light to the oppressions which must ensue.

As for their attacking Canada, that is impossible whilst we have so many large vessels which command the navigation of Lake Champlain; and as for their privateers, they cannot annoy our ships, as we shall send none upon their coast to the southward of Penobscot.

A strong garrison and squadron* will undoubtedly be maintained at Halifax, from which 800 or 1000 men may make frequent expeditions upon the whole rebel coast, which is so extensive, that it cannot be protected; the shipping therefore will be destroyed, as it was by Admiral Graves at Falmouth†.

A war carried on upon this plan will be far less expensive, at the same time that the distress will be infinitely greater to the rebels, so that they must soon apply to the mother country for a cessation of hostilities.

If peace indeed should be concluded between Great Britain and the revolted colonies, the terms of which they should afterwards infringe, we shall undoubtedly proceed against them in this mode of warfare, instead of the more expensive and less effectual plan of maintaining and marching large armies upon the continent of North America.

I shall now proceed to state the comparative losses of England and France during the present war, and from the same authentic materials, as far as they would furnish light. Our Gazette, however, being silent with regard to the capture of privateers or merchant ships‡ in the European seas, I shall not pretend

* These should consist of small frigates and sloops, which draw little water.

† The damage done at this port, with only 100 troops, was valued by the inhabitants to Congress at 200,000l. sterling.

‡ Except a whole or large part of a convoy is taken.

to enumerate such prizes on one side or the other. It may be safely asserted, however, that the balance is greatly in our favour on both these articles.

It need scarcely be observed, that our present war with France is almost entirely confined to naval operations, and that therefore seamen are the material requisite to both nations. It may indeed be pronounced impossible to pursue a naval war for any length of years, unless an extensive trade is at the same time carried on.

France, by the treaty of Paris, had ceded Canada to the English, as well as Louisiana to the Spaniards, and having consequently lost both these channels of trade, began a maritime war with some disadvantage; whereas the navigation to Canada furnished an additional number of seamen to the English.

Our commerce to the East Indies had greatly increased also during the peace*, whilst that of France had comparatively dwindled in those parts.

England, however, having had the superiority in the last war, and decisively at sea, the French were determined to build several large ships at the expence of the provinces or great towns, which might make the contest more equal, if hostilities between the two nations should commence afresh. Their navy therefore was rather in a formidable state, when the American rebellion unfortunately furnished the golden opportunity of supporting our enemies, as well as pretext to become the *protectors of freedom*.

Soon after the declaration of war, Admiral Montagu dispossessed them of the islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre, the consequence of which was, the total loss of their Newfoundland

* Before this period we used to send large sums of silver for the Indian trade.

fishery, another great source of seamen, whilst our trade to the great bank of course increased, by neither French nor Americans interfering with this valuable branch of commerce.

Soon after this followed the reduction of Pondicherry and Mahie, as also of every French fort or settlement on the continent of India, together with the necessary loss of all naval intercourse between France and those parts.

The French coasting trade is comparatively much inferior to ours*; they have moreover no whale fishery, and little commerce with the Baltick, especially during a war with England.

The only resources therefore for seamen seem to be their Mediterranean and sugar trades.

As for the former, it is admitted to be in a state of prosperity, but with regard to the latter, the checks it hath received have been very considerable.

We have, both in the American and European seas, taken parts of convoys from and to the French sugar islands, besides many rich captures by privateers. The distresses of the French planters, however, during the present war, do not end here.

In this country the clamours of the merchants for protection check our naval exertions; but in France they are not the least attended to, when it interferes with reasons of state, whether real or imaginary†.

The consequence of this is, that the French merchant or planter can never depend upon regular convoys as with us, and the cargo therefore is much depreciated in its value, or captured

* It need scarcely be observed, that Great Britain and Ireland, being both islands, must necessarily have a great extent of coast.

† It is true that England sometimes lays embargoes upon our trading vessels; but how seldom is this practised!

by sailing without any protection. From hence it seems to follow, that this branch of commerce for the supply of seamen cannot furnish so many as might otherwise be expected from it.

The French have, during the present war indeed, fitted out large fleets, but it is from these two channels of trade only that seamen can be supplied, whilst those of the Mediterranean have always been esteemed much inferior to those of the ocean.

The number requisite for the royal navy must be very great, if it is considered that the ships of war carry so many hands, and that by sickness or the common accidents of war it may be supposed that one-fourth will be unserviceable before the expiration of a year. Allowing therefore 40,000 seamen to be necessary for the royal navy of France, the few remaining channels of trade must furnish 10,000 yearly; after which how are their merchant vessels to be properly navigated?

But it will be contended that the reasoning from these facts deserves little attention, because the French continue to send forth considerable squadrons.

To this I answer, and from the above premises, that I conceive them to be at their last tether, if on our part we do not appear to be too anxious for peace. If they suppose our situation on the other hand to be calamitous, the answer will be *va victis*. Individuals sometimes, upon overtures arising from their antagonists' distress, will act with moderation and honour, but this is never the case with nations, or the ministers who govern them.

Having thus endeavoured to shew that the French trade hath been so considerably reduced, as not to furnish probably the complement requisite for the royal navy, I shall now proceed to the next material requisite of naval stores.

France

France hath neither timber, hemp, or pitch within her own dominions, and must therefore be supplied from the Baltic. In time of peace even, great part of this trade was carried on in Dutch bottoms, and after war took place between England and France, entirely so.

Before the rupture with the Dutch, several of their vessels loaded with naval stores for Brest were properly condemned in our courts of Admiralty, and many such captures were made, as ships bound to France either from the Baltick or Holland (especially the latter) usually pass through what may be perhaps called our own turnpike.

France indeed before the war with England might have imported large quantities of naval stores, but if not supplied regularly from year to year, such an accumulation must soon be exhausted. It must have been scanty therefore since 1778 *; and still more so after the 20th of December, 1780, when hostilities commenced between England and Holland.

It may be confidently asserted that, within 4 months after this, we took 50 Dutch ships thus loaded for the French ports †, and consequently the supply for 1781 must have been very insignificant, and for 1782 scarcely any at all, as the Dutch during 1781 had no communication with the Baltick ‡.

* When war took place between England and France.

† The French, since these losses, have attempted to bring some naval stores by land carriage chiefly, from Holland to Brest. But this most expensive resource must soon fail, as what little may remain in Holland will be wanted for their own navy.

‡ It may be said perhaps that France will soon be supplied from the Northern powers: but the Dutch having so long been in possession of this branch of trade, new vessels do not spring up like mushrooms, nor can new credit be established immediately.

It will be again urged perhaps, that France continues to build and fit out ships of war; but from these facts it must be an expiring effort, if there be any truth in the old axiom of *ex nihilo nil fit*.

It may now be proper to consider how the balance may stand between England and France in point of territorial acquisitions which under all the other articles is so much in our favour.

We have lost Dominica, St. Vincent's, Tobago, Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Christopher's.

The three first were newly settled islands, and therefore could neither be thoroughly inhabited or cultivated; individuals who are proprietors must undoubtedly have suffered, but surely this cannot be stated as a great national calamity, especially as we are in possession of St. Lucia, which hath so much wood for fuel, such plenty of water, and such excellent ports, which in a great measure command Martinico*.

As for Nevis, it is little more than a speck; nor is Montserrat much more considerable: it must be admitted, however, that St. Christopher's for it's size is a very valuable island, the soil being excellent, it is therefore perhaps a more material loss than all the others before mentioned†.

Though the French are thus in possession of so many of our Leeward islands, yet perhaps much consolation is to be derived from their force being considerably diminished by the necessity of garrisoning their conquests, and, from their being greatly dispersed, it is hoped that they may be as easily re-acquired as they

* Admiral Rodney could not have obtained his late victory, from any other station but that of St. Lucia.

† This same island was reduced by the French in the midst of the duke of Marlborough's victories. So extensive is the British empire, that it is impossible to be sufficiently armed in every quarter, and at all seasons.

were lost. A planter is generally ready to attorn to the last invader, as he commonly by these means saves his property; nor is he much concerned whether he carries his sugars to an English or French market.

But much better consolation is to be procured, by turning our eyes to the East Indies, where we have driven the French from every fort and settlement upon the continent of India, so that since 1779 they have not sent a single ship to either the Malabar or Coromandel coast, Bengal, or China.

Their only remaining settlements are the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, which it is hoped they will long keep possession of, as the establishments are ruinously expensive, whilst the products are only coffee and cotton, which may so much cheaper be procured from the West Indies. Add to this, that in a French war with the Dutch, the inhabitants might be starved, as much the greatest part of their live stock and provisions come from the Cape of Good Hope*.

Surely there can be no doubt that these important conquests in India greatly over-balance the loss of a few sugar islands†, especially as the French are thus deprived of procuring any saltpetre, which I shall more particularly dwell upon when the account of debtor and creditor is stated between England and the Dutch.

I shall not here discuss whether England or France is the better enabled to continue the war in point of finance, as I do not pretend to be at all acquainted with the French resources in this respect. Thus much however may be safely advanced, that a nation, which hath never broken it's public faith with it's cre-

* They now and then indeed procure a few cattle from Madagascar.

† None of which are of much importance except St. Christopher's.

ditors, is more likely to be trusted than an arbitrary government which hath repeatedly been guilty of this violation *.

We know also, from the proper department, that in the present session 70 millions were offered to the treasury upon rather lower terms than the preceding year; it was likewise declared, from the same authority, that taxes were not wanting for paying the interest of what might be borrowed for the campaign of 1783.

To this I will add, that two such neighbouring and rival nations as England and France will commonly be at war every twenty years till one or the other is thoroughly depressed; whilst it may be presumed the island must prevail over the continental territory in the long run. England indeed may receive great checks during the course of a war; but the most sanguine Frenchman cannot flatter himself with conquering an island so inhabited as Great Britain is, unless our own civil dissensions give our determined enemies the wished-for opportunity of invasion.

The British empire therefore seems to be much less liable to annihilation at least, than those which at present exist, or which history hath delivered down to us.

At all events, we must not repine too much at the expence of the present war, for I fear it is a national fine which we must commonly pay every twenty years, unless we choose to acknowledge the superiority of France.

Spain next to France commenced hostilities against England, after having been at considerable charge by equipping a navy for the Portuguese and Algerine wars. Whatever expences either

* The small quantity of gold which circulates in France in proportion to their silver is a further proof of the comparative poverty of France, as England is said to have lately re-coined upwards of 25,000,000*l.* in gold.

nations or individuals incur, they always like to have something for their money, though perhaps the debt thereby may be increased: thus he, who hath bought a dress for the masquerade, thinks it afterwards good oeconomy to give another guinea for his ticket of admission.

But besides, however, that the Spanish navy was in much better order than usual, France held out the alluring bait of Gibraltar, which it was supposed that England must soon lose, whilst surrounded with such numerous enemies. Spain therefore, immediately upon the rupture, informed every court in Europe that it was intended to blockade this much-envied rock.

How this war hath answered to this third enemy will appear by the annexed table; but though the balance upon the whole is much in our favour, yet it must be admitted that in two articles it is against us.

The first of these is *territorial acquisitions*, for the Spaniards have prevailed both in West Florida and Minorca; nor can we set against these the forts Omoa, S. Juan, and San Pedro, as we have abandoned these conquests*.

As for West Florida, we lost that province after a vast expence incurred in the attack for two successive years; and Pensacola fell at last perhaps only by one of the redoubts being accidentally blown up†.

The trifling produce of this infant colony was sent away before the first siege, in four ships only, and therefore we have no-

* For the time however we were in possession, the inconvenience must have been great to Spain. Fort Omoa was supposed to have cost them 200,000*l.* besides the quick-silver and Register ships taken in the harbour.

† It is perhaps to be wished that, when peace is concluded, Spain should be presented with E. Florida likewise, as it is high time we should be rid of it.

thing to regret in the loss of it, but the garrison and many acres of unfruitful sand, attended with as great expence in the civil government of the colony, as if the inhabitants had been more numerous, or the soil more fertile.

As for the conquest of Fort St. Philip, the charge of its fortifications and garrison were known to be enormous; but this also must have been very great in the reduction of it by the Spaniards, who had carried on the siege for half a year, and the ~~post~~ *fort* was at last only surrendered by the unfortunate sickness of the garrison*.

The second article in balance against England, in the account with Spain, is in the number of troops arising from the reduction of Fort St. Philip and Pensacola, the amount of which I suppose to be 1650, but under the more valuable head of seamen Spain hath lost 6643.

With regard to the resources which may enable the Spaniards to continue the naval war, I should much doubt, whether the whole trade of the country, if carried on as in time of peace, would supply this deficiency.

Their ships of war, moreover, must probably be in worse plight from year to year, as Spain hath scarcely any naval stores within herself, and the Dutch have been prevented, for the last year and a half, from supplying them with salted provisions from Ireland†.

* It is possible that the putrid complaint, which carried off such numbers, may have arisen from the garrison being so often under casemates during a siege of six months. The air in casemates cannot be very wholesome; and as for the provisions, they are stated by general Murray to have been excellent. The troops at Gibraltar have been very healthy, notwithstanding the much longer siege, but then it is to be remarked, that there are few casemates.

† The French must suffer still more in this last respect.

Even

Even in their principal and almost only harbour of Cadiz, they have no docks, and consequently their ships cannot be speedily refitted.

As for the finances of Spain, I cannot but conceive that they must be in a most wretched plight, as considerable expence had been incurred both for the Portuguese war, and the disgraceful expedition against Algiers, before the rupture with England. I never heard, indeed, of a Spanish loan, and therefore conclude, that the extraordinary millions necessary for prosecuting the war* have been chiefly raised hitherto by benevolences from the clergy, and perhaps some part half-extorted from the Caracca company, which is the only wealthy one of the kingdom†. Benevolences, however, cannot be depended upon for any long continuance, nor is a rupture with England ever popular with the bulk of the nation, who are always losers by the measures which are dictated by France.

I now come to the fourth enemy of England, viz. the Dutch, and have the satisfaction to find that every balance, on every head, is in our favour, without any deduction to be made for the most trifling successes on the part of Holland‡.

The justice and necessity of the war need not here be dwelt upon; but the fortunate events of it on our part may be confidently asserted to have already reduced the States to absolute ruin.

Hostilities commenced on the 20th of December, 1780, and within four months we had captured in the European seas 201

* The sieges of Gibraltar and Fort St. Philip have been enormously chargeable, nor was West Florida reduced for a trifle.

† Both gentry and the inhabitants at large of Spain are by all travellers represented as incapable of paying additional taxes.

‡ Except by our loss of the *Crescent* frigate.

vessels*, together with two ships of war of 50 guns. Within the same time we were in possession of Eustatius, the stores and merchandize being computed at three millions, 200 vessels†, with a ship of 60 guns, a frigate of 36, and five armed vessels. Demerary and Essequibo also submitted to England in the month of March, with thirty-five ships of merchandize.

Here let us pause an instant, and observe, that none of these 435 trading vessels could have been insured against captures by the enemy, for war could not have been in contemplation at the time of their sailing‡.

The merchants of London are at least as opulent as those of Amsterdam; and must not the capture of such a number of ships, without receiving any insurance to abate the loss, have produced almost a general bankruptcy throughout the metropolis?

It hath been already observed, that it is impossible to carry on a naval war, without at the same time enjoying an extensive trade for the supply of seamen.

Since December 1780, the Dutch have not sent § a single

* This appears by Loyd's books, which I could have wished to have had time for consulting with regard to several other articles.

† 150 only when Eustatius was taken possession of, but the other 50 may be fairly added by the capture of the Dutch sugar convoy a few days afterwards; and many other vessels which fell into our hands by its not being known that we had reduced the island. Two thirds of the sugar convoy indeed were afterwards captured by the French, but this does not lessen the loss to Holland.

‡ The Dutch seem to have been so confident, that England could not venture to declare war against an additional enemy, that though Sir Joseph Yorke had, in November 1780, informed them in what amounted to express terms, that hostilities would follow their not giving satisfaction, yet they made no sort of preparation for the threat being carried into execution.

§ A convoy was indeed proceeding from the Texel in July 1781, but was stopped by Admiral Parker.

ship to the Baltic, nor on their whale or herring fisheries; whilst at the same time it appears by the representations of their merchants to the States, that their Mediterranean trade must necessarily be carried on in neutral bottoms.

For a year and a half, therefore, these resources for seamen have entirely failed them, though the merchants in many instances must have paid wages to the crews of ships detained in the Texel, and in all cases must have lost the use of their vessels, thus mouldering in port.

The Dutch have, however, two great trading companies for the West and East Indies, from which perhaps it may be urged that they may receive some supply of mariners.

As for the West Indies, after the reduction of Eustathius, Demerary, and Essequebo*, no territory remained to them but Surinam and Curacoa, the communication with which is become extremely precarious, and must continue so, as both outward and homeward vessels necessarily pass by our coasts.

In respect to the East Indies, both the trade and possessions of the Dutch in those quarters must be admitted to have been very important, but it will be found that they have still suffered more in this quarter of the world than in America.

Just at the breaking out of the war between the two nations, a Dutch ship of 1000 tons, bound for Batavia, and laden with all sorts of naval stores, was captured; four more of 1000 tons, to-

* Their being since retaken by the French does not alter the case at all with regard to the distresses of the Dutch, nor can do so, till some years have elapsed, and much publick treasure must issue from the mother country, before they can become again colonies of any value.—When Sir George Rodney's frigates, in April 1782, looked into the bay of Eustathius, there were only two schooners.

getlier with an outward-bound ship to Ceylon, fell into the hands of Commodore Johnston, and one of the same size was burnt *. A seventh was sunk by the Tartar privateer, whilst four others in company escaped into Cadiz, where it is said they have disposed of their cargoes. In short, no East-India ship of the Dutch hath either reached Holland or the East-Indies for this year and a half.

Let us now consider the wretched condition of their Asiatic settlements.

We have already taken from them every establishment on the coast of Coromandel and Bengal, as well as those on the northern part of the Malabar side: In short, nothing is left to them on the whole continent of Asia, except Cochin †, with its dependent factories, on the southern part of the Malabar coast, which by all accounts can make but feeble resistance to the meditated attack that probably is already carried into execution.

To these losses on the part of Holland we must add our recent conquest in Ceylon ‡, and the dispossessing that nation of all their settlements in the island of Sumatra.

* In Saldanha bay.

† They have also indeed a factory at Malacca.

The Dutch settlement at the Cape is not mentioned amongst these, not only because it is not in Asia, but because it is hoped that Holland will continue to possess this establishment, attended with so considerable an expence to the mother country, without making any return, except in a small quantity of wine.

Holland, with regard to this colony, may be properly compared to an individual, who builds a commodious inn upon a great road, by which travellers indeed, and perhaps the inn-keeper is benefited, but the landlord does not receive the proper interest for the money which he hath laid out in the accommodation.

‡ With the two rich prizes from Batavia.

In reality, therefore, nothing remains to the Dutch in Asia but the southern and western coast of Ceylon, the islands of Java and Celebes, a palisaded fort on Borneo, together with what are called their Spice islands*, which in all human probability must be reduced long before they can be assisted from Europe, as their garrisons, taken all together, do not exceed 1000 Europeans†.

The Dutch, therefore, may be pronounced to be already bankrupts in this principal branch of their commerce.

But the important consequence of these our valuable conquests does not rest here, for, if the war is to continue, I do not conceive how our enemies can procure any supply of saltpetre, for the French and Dutch are now driven from the continent of Asia, whence alone they can import it in any considerable quantity‡.

If our East-India company, therefore, does not, for the sake of a high price, furnish our enemies with this so necessary a commodity, how can the war be long protracted§?

Let us now recapitulate the several losses of the Dutch East-India company.

* Chiefly Amboina for cloves, and Banda for mace and nutmegs.

† See a very clear state of the Dutch settlements in the East-Indies, by a person long resident in India. Printed for G. Robinson, Paternoster-row, 1780.

‡ The Danes indeed (and perhaps the Portuguese) bring often some saltpetre in their India ships, and a little is made in Europe, but the amount of all this is very trifling for so extensive a war. In the reign of Charles the First, there were several proclamations, empowering certain officers to enter pigeon-houses and stables for this purpose. See Rymer's Fœdera.

§ It need not be observed, that immense quantities must have been consumed in the sieges of Gibraltar and St. Philip's.

We have taken seven of their India ships* and destroyed two†, whilst the cargoes of four others have never been landed in Holland: this may perhaps be stated at nearly one million.

In the factory of Chinsura alone, as I have been most credibly informed, were found fifty lacks of rupees or 600,000*l.* sterling, together with rich investments, amounting probably to a second million.

A third may be reasonably added by what hath been found at Surat and Broach, the settlements on Sumatra, Ceylon, and the whole coast of Coromandel.

The Dutch East-India company was undoubtedly very rich; but what trade can possibly be supported under such losses, at the same time that no ship from Asia hath entered any Dutch port this year and a half, nor is likely to be able so to do? If any should indeed have during the present spring escaped, they will probably fail for ports which are already in our possession‡, or may be so by the time of their arrival in India.

But the ruin of this company does not end here, for if England restored all the territory acquired by conquest to-morrow, it must be years before the fortifications and factories could be re-established. Nor will trade easily return to a channel which it hath once abandoned.

* Viz. five, by Commodore Johnston, and two by Sir Edward Hughes.

† Viz. one by Commodore Johnston, and one by the Tartar privateer.

‡ We are indeed in possession of all their principal ports for trade, as none is left in India or Bengal, except Cochin on the Malabar coast. The spice trade does not require many tons of shipping, and as for Batavia (or rather Java) the products are not wanted in Europe.

Surely

Surely Holland under this accumulation of distresses cannot long maintain the present war with England, for the carrying on of which she seems to have no adequate resources.

There is a general notion (whether well founded or not I will not presume to say) that there is a large sum deposited in the Treasury of Amsterdam, to answer great emergencies; but if the fact be true, one may venture to pronounce that it must be by this time expended.

The country itself belonging to the Republick, is small in extent, and, for the greater part, of an indifferent soil, whilst the keeping up their dikes and fortifications exhausts the produce of considerable taxes. The publick revenue in such a country must arise, therefore, from excise or customs, both of which must nearly fail, upon the great decay, I had almost said annihilation, of their commerce*.

I cannot conclude with regard to the necessary superiority of England to Holland in a naval war, without taking notice of the great disadvantage their fleets lie under from the shallowness of their ports. On this account it is agreed on all hands, that no ship can exceed the size of a seventy-four, nor can it be carried into a situation so as to proceed on its voyage without the assistance of machines called *Camels*.

Under all these impediments, can it be conceived that Holland must wish to continue hostilities? or should England, who hath scarcely lost a ship or subject by the Dutch war, be the first to apply for peace, whilst at home we enjoy not only se-

* How great would be the clamour in England if the entrance of the Thames should be blocked up by the enemy for eighteen months as the Texel hath nearly been?

curity but prosperity *, and whilst our trade flourishes nearly as much as if we had no enemy to contend with ?

The comparative account between England, Hyder Ally, and the Marattas, may be more shortly stated, and will not want a table.

We suffered a disastrous defeat by the troops of this chieftain, which was solely occasioned by the explosion of our magazine. The loss, to the best of my recollection, hath been generally stated at 3000, of which a considerable part were Europeans †.

Before this, however, Hyder had been thoroughly beaten by our troops, since which Sir Eyre Coote hath obtained three victories against him, and it is said hath obliged him to leave great part of the Carnatic ‡. Sir Edward Hughes also destroyed his whole naval force on the Malabar coast, so that our affairs now seem to wear a prosperous aspect.

It is much to be lamented that we have occasion for war with the Marattas, but it is to be feared that, whilst we have so extensive a territorial empire in India, we shall not be able always to avoid it. Our tributaries must frequently be liable to attacks from these maroders, and as they abound so much in cavalry, it is difficult to overtake or defeat them, collected in any considerable body.

* What village, town, or district, can be pointed out where there are not evident signs of such prosperity ?

† 600 Europeans.

‡ He was supposed to be still in possession of Arcot when the last accounts came from India, as the Monsoon prevented Sir Eyre Coote from keeping the field. 2000 of Hyder Ally's troops were also defeated during the siege of Negapatam, 1000 of which were cavalry. The Polygars likewise in the Tanjore country abandoned Hyder upon the surrender of Negapatam. I am happy here to add also the late important success in the neighbourhood of Telicherry.

We

We have, however, obtained many advantages over them, and particularly under the command of Colonel Goddard *, who took from them the important fortress of Bassien, defended by more than 200 cannon. Nor do I recollect any considerable loss on our part, except in the march of Colonel Egerton † towards Poonah. The killed and wounded, however, upon this occasion, were only 260, and not more than 60 of these Europeans.

Upon the whole, therefore, our successes against this our last enemy, have greatly overbalanced our defeats, and by the last advices from India, it was supposed that a peace was nearly settled between the Marattas and the East-India company.

Thus I hope to have proved that England rises superior to the formidable combination against which she is opposed, and that therefore she hath no occasion to sue for peace from any quarter, though it is hoped she will cheerfully embrace any terms that are both just and honourable.

Misfortunes make a deeper impression than blessings, both upon individuals and nations, as the gamester seldom remembers his winnings, whilst he dwells upon his losses. As it is in vain to offer arguments of consolation to those who despair, I could scarcely have flattered myself that the Publick (depressed as it was) would have paid any attention to the foregoing facts and observations, if we had not lately obtained such signal successes. The better hopes, therefore, which such advantages must naturally inspire, may possibly prevail upon an English reader to cast his eye over some of these pages,

* In his march from Culpee to Surat in 1778, Captain Popham also surprized the almost impregnable fortress of Gualeor.

† In January 1779,

which otherwise perhaps would have been thrown into the fire,
and I shall be truly happy if I convince him, as I have myself,
that we are not a ruined nation.

O Tite, sei quid ego adjûro, coiramve levassô,
Quai nunc te coquit, & versat sub pectore fixa,
Et quâ deprimeris frustra noctesque, diesque;
Ecquid erit praimî?

ENN.

33

R

2	—	22	—	—	N. America, Charles Town, Ditto, Waclaw,	Adm. Arbuthnot, Ditto, Sir H. Clinton, Col. Tarleton, Adm. Arbuthnot, Sir P. Parker, Ld Cornwallis,	Jan. 22. Feb. 26. June 13. Ibid. July 5. Soon after. July 29.
9	—	10	—	—	Jamaica, Camden,		1781.
6	—	—	—	214 120 2000	Ann and Forts George, Cape Fear, Hillborough,	Col. Tarleton, Ld Cornwallis	Jan. 16. Feb. 17. March 31. May 11.
25	—	—	—	500	Camden, New York, Newfoundland, Connecticut, New York, Jamaica,	Ld Rawdon C. Affleck, Adm. Edwards, Arnold and Adm. Graves, Sir P. Parker,	June 5. Sept. 25. Oct. 20. Nov. 6. Ibid. Nov. 17.
39	—	—	—	—			
11	—	—	—	—			
6	—	—	—	—			
15	—	—	—	—			
37	—	—	—	1000	S. Carolina, New York,	Col. Steward, Adm. Digby,	1782. Feb. 2. April 27.
14	33	2020 200	20200* 8000†	23894 10651			
Balance in favour of England, 1820				12200			
				13243			

ENGLISH LOSE BY REBELS.

Frigates.	Privateers.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	To what Rebel General.	In what Gazette, or about what time.
				706	Bunker's Hill,	—	1775. July 25.
				250	Sullivan's Island,	Gen. Lee,	1776. Aug. 24.
				887 400 3500	Trenton, Bennington, Saratoga,	Washington, Gates,	1777. Feb. 25. Nov. 1. Dec. 13.
				408 300†	Stoney Point, Boston,	—	1779. Oct. 5.
		200§	4000	400 3800	S. Carolina, under Col. } Tarleton, Virginia, Ld Cornwallis,	—	1781. March 31.
		200	3000	10651	Rochambeau and Washington,	—	Dec. 18.

* Supposing ten seamen on board each vessel; but, as several of these ships were not finished, or the seamen escaped, 4000 perhaps should be deducted.
† The reason of 8000 being here deducted, appears from the foregoing note.
‡ Highlanders who were captured in Boston Harbour, not knowing that Sir W. Howe had evacuated the town.
§ Which are probably more than were taken.

N^o. I. R E B E L L I O U S E.

Figures.	Privateers.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	to what rank Admiral or General.	In what Gazette.
		73	—	—	Boston,	Adm. Graves,	1776.
		44	—	—	Ibid.	L. Souleham,	but authentic.
		35	—	—	Antigua,	Adm. Young,	June 8.
		24	—	—	Quebec,	Sir Guy Carlton,	June 10.
		17	—	—	North America,	Ld. Shuldham,	29.
			—	—	Antigua,	Adm. Young,	
			—	—	Long Island,	Sir W. Howe,	Octob. 10.
			—	—	New York,	Ditto,	Nov. 4.
			—	—	Antigua,	Ditto,	Dec. 30.
		112	—	—	New York,	Adm. Young,	Ibid.
			—	—	Jamaica,	Adm. Gayton,	1777.
		5	—	—	New York,	Ld Howe,	Feb. 25.
		203	—	—	Ibid.	Ditto,	July 12.
		25	—	—	Jamaica,	Adm. Gayton,	May 10.
		23	—	—	At Danberry,	Sir W. Howe,	June 13.
			—	—	Antigua,	Adm. Young,	June 7.
		18	—	—	Ibid.	Ditto,	18.
		13	—	—	Brandy Wine,	Sir W. Howe,	Aug. 2.
			—	—	German Town,	Gen. Grey,	Dec. 2.
			—	—	Delaware,	Sir W. Howe,	Ibid.
		118	—	—	Jamaica,	Ld Howe,	Dec. 6.
			—	—	Delaware, &c.	Adm. Gayton,	1778.
		235	—	—	Ibid.	Ld Howe,	April 27.
		93	—	—	Leward Islands,	Major Maitland,	June 6.
		30	—	—	Jamaica,	Col. Abercrombie,	13.
			—	—	Leward Islands,	Adm. Young,	Ibid.
		10	—	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	July 11.
		25	—	—	Jamaica,	Adm. Young,	Ibid.
		15	—	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	Sept. 15.
		41	—	—	Ditto,	Sir P. Parker,	26.
		12	—	—	N. America, Bedford,	Ditto,	Oct. 27.
		70	—	—	N. America,	Gen. Grey,	Ibid.
		218	—	—	Egg Island,	Ld Howe,	Nov. 24.
		10	—	—	Jamaica,	Capt. Ferguson,	Dec. 1.
			—	—	N. America,	Sir P. Parker,	1779.
		5	—	—	N. America,	Adm. Gambier,	Jan. 9.
		53	—	—	Savannah,	Gen. Campbell,	Feb. 6.
		15	—	—	Ibid.	H. Parker,	23.
		126	—	—	Ebenezer,	Gen. Prevot,	Ibid.
		25	—	—	N. America,	Adm. Gambier,	April 20.
		130	—	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	May 29.
			—	—	Virginia,	Gen. Matthew,	June 26.
			—	—	Newfoundland,	Sir G. Collier,	June 26.
			—	—	Penn. Scott,	Adm. Edwards,	Sept. 11.
			—	—	Ibid.	Sir Ged Collier,	24.
			—	—	Ibid.	Ditto,	Ibid.
			—	—	Stone Ferry, S. Carolina,	Ditto,	Ibid.
			—	—	Newfoundland,	Adm. Edwards,	Dec. 7.
			—	—	N. America,	Adm. Arbuthnot,	1780.
			—	—	Charles Town,	Ditto,	Jan. 22.
			—	—	Ditto,	Sir H. Clinton,	Feb. 26.
			—	—	Wacław,	Col. Tarleton,	June 13.
			—	—		Adm. Arbuthnot,	Ibid.
			—	—			July 5.
			—	—			Soon after.

(1)

Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	To what Spanish General.	In what Gazette, or about what time.
		50	1250†	400 600	Baton Rouge, Madeira, Pensacola,	Galvez, Cordova, Galvez,	1781. April 1. Oct. 13.
		50	1250	1000 § 2000 350	Minorca,	Crillon,	1782. March 26.
				1650	Balance against England.		

Nº IV. D U T C H L O S E.

Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	To what English Admiral or General.	In what Gazette.
, 60,	Princess Caroline, 54, Rotterdam, 50, Mars, 36, 5 ships of war,	— — — — 150 30 30 24 11 10	300 300 450 300 — — — — — — —	— — — — — — — — — — —	Channel, Ditto, Near Eufatius, At Eufatius, Ditto, Near Eufatius, After the Capture, Demerary, Iffquebo, Jamaica,	— — — — — — — — — — — Sir G. B. Rodney,	1781. Jan. 2. 9. March 13.
1 frigate, 1 ditto in the Texel,	— —	5 India ships, 1 burnt, 15 300	600 — — — 8640 **	— — — — —	Near the Cape, Ibid. Jamaica, Channel,	Sir P. Parker, Adm. Parker, Ditto, Comm. Johnson, Ditto, Sir P. Parker,	April 23. June 17. — — — Oct. 16.
3	8	576 **	10590				

* Supposing that half of the seamen on board these two ships driven on shore may have escaped.

† These 81 ships, multiplied by 20, would give 1701 for the seamen on board; but the 9 five-ships being deducted, there remains only 1442.

‡ N. B. 25 seamen are allowed to each of these 50 ships, as some of them were outward-bound to the East Indies.

§ N. B. General Murray states only 600 to have been fit for duty.

|| It appears by Lloyd's books, that 201 Dutch vessels were taken in or near the Channel before the end of August 1781; and, probably, another 100 may have been captured since that period.

** These 576 vessels, multiplied by 15, give 8640 seamen.

N^o. III. S P A N I S H L O S S .

Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	To what English Admiral or General.	In what Gazette.
Guipuscoano, 64,	5	13	600	—	Near Ferrol, Ibid.	Sir G. B. Rodney, Ibid.	1780. Jan. 22. Ibid.
4 carried into Gibraltar, 1 blown up, 2 driven on shore,	—	—	2800	—	Gibraltar,	Sir G. B. Rodney,	Feb. 28.
	—	—	700	—	Jamaica Station,	Capt. Ingles,	March 11.
	—	—	700*	—	Gibraltar,	Sir P. Parker,	July 29.
	—	—	400	—	Jamaica,	Ditto,	Ibid.
	—	—	300	—	Ditto,	Ditto,	June 5. 17.
	—	—	300	—	Ditto,	Ditto,	1781. March 10.
	—	—	166	—	Gibraltar,	Cerberus,	Dec. 25.
	—	—	300	—	Gibraltar,	Capt. Poole,	1782. April 2. Ibid.
	—	—	1442†	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	1783. April 2. Ibid.
	—	—	7185	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	1783. April 2. Ibid.
	—	—	1250	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	1783. April 2. Ibid.
	—	—	5935	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	1783. April 2. Ibid.
	—	—	5935	—	Jamaica,	Sir P. Parker,	1783. April 2. Ibid.

ENGLISH LOSE BY SPAIN.

Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Vessels.	Seamen.	Troops.	Where.	To what Spanish General.	In what Gazette, or about what time.

NEW YORK CHURCH

P O S T S C R I P T.

SINCE the table of the comparative losses of England and France was printed, I find that the capture of our frigate the *Crescent* hath not been noticed: the balance, therefore, in our favour should be lessened by one frigate, and perhaps 220 seamen. I do not mean by this to insinuate, that this is the only mistake in these tables, but conceive that there are none of any considerable importance, for though as a good Englishman I am happy to find the balance so much in our favour, yet I have always intended to give the fullest allowance to every article on the enemy's side of the account, whilst at the same time some material articles are omitted in favour of Great Britain. I will give one instance of this out of many which might be mentioned. On board the *merchant* ships taken from the French, there must have been at least 4000 seamen, which do not appear in that column of their losses. If it be objected that I have not given credit to the French for any English ships of *merchandize*, the answer is, that the balance of prizes in the European seas was certainly on the side of England, whilst the French scarcely took a single English trading vessel in those of America. If every article, therefore, was to be canvassed, I am persuaded that the advantages of England in the prosecution of the present war, would appear to be still greater than they have been stated.





